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*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov
during Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 2, 4 April 1972,
Helsinki:*

Trusov said that during the recess before the present phase the Soviet side had once again analyzed the differences remaining in regard to constraints on ABM radars and also on large phased-array radars which are not ABM radars. As it had noted in Vienna, the Soviet Delegation believes that it is sufficient to have geographic constraints on the deployment of ABM radars without any numerical limitations, inasmuch as the number of such radars to be deployed within the agreed radius of deployment for ABM system components for defense of the national capitals and with an agreed number of ABM interceptors and launchers is determined by the specific engineering approaches underlying the system to be deployed. The discussions in Vienna showed that the radius of 150 kilometers, which the Soviet Delegation had proposed for limiting the deployment of ABM means for capital defense, did not evoke any objection in principle from the US side.

Trusov then said that, in view of the considerations expressed by the US Delegation regarding the limitation of ABM radars deployed for the defense of the national capital to a certain agreed number of modern ABM radar complexes, the Soviet Delegation, for the purpose of working out a compromise solution, had said that the Soviet side would be prepared to accept this concept. The number and nature of the ABM radars within these complexes would not be constrained. In advancing to meet the US side in regard to the question of limiting ABM radars for the defense of the national capital, the USSR Delegation believes that the US side regarded with due consideration the Soviet views on possible ways to solve these questions which were expressed in Vienna on January 18 and 25, 1971.

Trusov then said that the Soviet Delegation would like to reaffirm its view that proposals which put constraints on large radars which can be used for other systems and purposes not related to ABM systems, and in particular to air defense systems, are unacceptable. The Soviet side cannot agree to placing constraints with numerical criteria on radars in the form of power-aperture product, or to adoption of a list of charac-

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teristics, or to use of US ABM radars as a standard. As is known, in advancing to meet the US side, the Soviet Delegation had agreed to include in the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty obligations not to give missile-warning radars and radars other than ABM radars ABM capabilities and not to test them in an ABM mode. The Soviet Delegation considers that the provisions already agreed to in the Draft Treaty are sufficient to preclude circumvention of the constraints to be placed on ABM radars and at the same time not place constraints on systems that are not for ABM defenses. The Soviet Delegation is convinced that a business-like approach to solution of these two questions will enable the two sides to reach mutually acceptable solutions to them. This, in turn, would facilitate mutually acceptable solutions to other questions not yet agreed.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 2, 4 April 1972, Helsinki:

Pleshakov said that, as he understood Ambassador Smith's statement that morning, the US side considers that the Soviet proposal of December 15, 1971, for setting limitations on levels of ABM systems is unacceptable and rejects the proposal. He would not hide the fact that the Soviet Delegation has regrets in connection with such an answer since it is convinced that its proposal could be a good basis for finding a mutually acceptable solution.

Pleshakov declared that, in this regard, he wanted to recall the considerations which had guided the USSR Delegation in tabling its proposal of December 15, 1971. First of all, the Soviet Delegation had in mind the Understanding of May 20, 1971, between the two Governments which provided for maintaining the principle of equal conditions for limiting ABM systems and no unilateral advantages. The USSR Delegation has repeatedly given a well-founded rationale showing that this principle is embodied in its proposal. Moreover, the Soviet proposal that the deployment of ABM systems be limited in the US to the protection of a certain number of ICBM launchers and in the USSR to defense of the national capital and a number of ICBM launchers equal to 50 percent of the number protected in the US insures low levels of limitation in both the US and USSR. It also takes into account the condition of the development of ABM systems in the US and USSR. Minister Pleshakov also wanted to make special note of the compromise nature of the Soviet proposal of December 15 which took into account the appropriate comments of the US side.

Pleshakov said that the question now arose as to whether Ambassador Smith's statement had improved the conditions for searching for a mutually acceptable solution on the key question of limiting ABMs. The situation evoked doubt within the Soviet Delegation. Agreeing the positions of the two sides in this respect requires the efforts of both sides. As is known, the Soviet Delegation has repeatedly presented initiatives

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Trusov during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT delegate Allison, 4 April 1972, Helsinki:

Trusov launched into a discussion of "other large phased-array radars," defending the Soviet position and reaffirming the unacceptability of OLPAR constraints with the standard arguments. He said that OLPARs could not be limited in an ABM Treaty without limiting air defense capabilities, and contended that the US should find sufficient the Soviet agreement to undertake obligations to not give air defense radars ABM capabilities or test them in an ABM mode and to not convert air defense radars to ABM system use.

I told Trusov that we understand the Soviet concern about limiting air defense capabilities. Our concern differs in that we do not see the pure air defense application of very large and powerful radars but believe that the deployment of such radars could provide a base for a possible wide-spread ABM system. When we were given to understand that the Soviet side objected to numerical criteria, we attempted to meet that consideration by suggesting the use of our Missile Site Radar as a standard. If neither of these US proposals for providing appropriate verifiable constraints is adequate to meet Soviet considerations, we must still seek through mutual effort a solution to the problem. Trusov indicated that perhaps the US side could come up with a third suggestion.

Trusov commented as an aside that he had read in a US publication something which indicated that the power-aperture product of the MSR is not 2.5 to 3×10^6 watt-meters squared as we had indicated; but something about 40 or 50 times greater. He said this apparently was a result of not multiplying average power by the proper area. I said that the radar builders state that the power-aperture product is about 2.5 to 3×10^6 --they are the ones who would know.

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on that score. In Vienna, it had submitted on September 7, 1971, a compromise proposal on the nature of the sites to be defended and levels. A new compromise solution was put forth on December 15 and 22, 1971. It seems that the search for a mutually acceptable solution is the guiding principle of our work and the only one which can provide a solution.

Reported remarks of Soviet SALT advisor Kishilov during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT advisor Garthoff, 4 April 1972, Helsinki:

M Kishilov told me that Semenov intended to ask Ambassador Smith to explain the specific new ABM position which Ambassador Smith had alluded to in their earlier conversation. He said that they understood we had "tied" it to the SLBM question. They did not approve of tying different things together that way, but were prepared to hear our suggestions on ABM levels even though we advanced them in the context of some conditions.

Kishilov suggested that we seemed reluctant to put forward our ABM views before we heard theirs. I asked again what their views were. I noted that toward the close of the last Vienna session, Kishilov and I had talked about various conceivable possibilities including 1 for 1 and 2 for 2. Kishilov said that, as he had said in Vienna, zero-zero was not in the cards, nor was 1 for 1. He then added that the Soviet side had not proposed 2 for 2. He asked if we favored 1 for 1. I declined to comment on the subject.

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Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT delegates Brown and Nitze, 1 April 1972, Helsinki:

Pleshakov reiterated his disappointment at Ambassador Smith's rejection of their December 15/22 proposal. He said he was not surprised at this rejection; he had interpreted Nitze's comments on March 30th as foreshadowing nonacceptance. He had hoped, however, that the US would have a new counter-proposal.

Pleshakov emphasized the compromise nature of their December 15/22 proposal; it took into account views that the US had expressed. The US had said it was not interested in a defense of Washington; the US had said that it was interested in a defense of ICBM silos. The Soviet side had made a concession to the US in that it provided for a defense of only 75 ICBM silos versus 150 silos at Grand Forks. Pleshakov indicated that his side had expressed this ICBM defense relation somewhat differently in its December 22 proposal in order to be able to say to their people that both sides had the same opportunity for the defense of ICBM silos.

Brown said it sounded as if Pleshakov's words had meant that, if the US side did not want to deploy a capital defense at the present time, but might want to do so at some time in the future, it would have the right to do so. Pleshakov replied, if the US side wants to make such proposal, the Soviet side would be prepared to discuss it. He also said that, "in his view, NCA/NCA would have been the most equitable solution and it could still be a solution."

Nitze asked whether the Soviet position remained unchanged; that the ICBM base to be defended by the USSR under their proposal would be outside the European part of the territory of the USSR. Pleshakov replied "probably (naverno)," but he could not affirm this. He went on to say that there would have to be qualitative controls on both the ABM interceptors and radars in this case. The ABM components could not have the capability of defending cities or large industrial targets.

Pleshakov went back to his point that their proposal had taken into account our views and contained concessions to those views; it was now appropriate for the

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US to come up with a compromise proposal of its own. Nitze said that the US August 20th proposal was a compromise proposal and had taken into account previous Soviet expressions of views. Nitze said that it was his recollection that both sides had made the same number of ABM proposals--five--and that it would be appropriate for both sides to negotiate equally for a solution. Pleshakov said he would have his people check the record on the numbers of proposals.

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*Formal statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov
during Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 2, 4 April 1972,
Helsinki:*

"At the meeting, on March 30, the Soviet Delegation reaffirmed the proposal for the sides to assume the obligation not to start, beginning with July 1, 1972 (but not before entry into force of the ABM Treaty) new construction of land-based ICBM silo launchers, and also not to convert land-based light ICBM silo launchers into land-based heavy ICBM silo launchers in the process of modernization and replacement. In this connection we proceed from the premise that national technical means make it possible with sufficient confidence to ensure verification of compliance with these obligations, and that in working out a 'freeze' agreement there is no need to introduce into this question additional details concerning the volume of missiles, the diameter and depth of silos."

*Reported remarks of Soviet SALT delegate Pleshakov
during a post-mini-plenary conversation with US SALT
delegate Nitze, 7 April 1972, Helsinki:*

As regards the number of ABM sites for ICBM defense, Pleshakov said that geological and geographical differences, and differences in weapons systems, and other factors had led to different methods of ICBM deployment in the two countries. The US had deployed ICBMs at bases having 150-200 silos. In the USSR, different numbers of silos are deployed at various deployment areas. National means of verification are able to determine precisely how many silos would be defended in each country.

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Formal statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov during Mini-Plenary Meeting No. 2, 4 April 1972, Helsinki:

"Today we would like to continue setting forth the USSR position on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

"At the last meeting, on March 30, the Soviet Delegation reaffirmed the proposal for the sides to assume the obligation not to start, beginning with July 1, 1972 (but not before entry into force of the ABM Treaty) new construction of land-based ICBM silo launchers, and also not to convert land-based light ICBM silo launchers into land-based heavy ICBM silo launchers in the process of modernization and replacement. In this connection we proceed from the premise that national technical means make it possible with sufficient confidence to ensure verification of compliance with these obligations, and that in working out a 'freeze' agreement there is no need to introduce into this question additional details concerning the volume of missiles, the diameter and depth of silos. Such details are not warranted by the scope and nature of the possible 'freeze' obligations of the sides and can only complicate agreement; this should evidently be avoided by both sides. Moreover, the subject of the obligation is laid down with sufficient clarity and in itself it does not demand any additional delimitations, for modernization and replacement will be carried out within the framework of the obligations assumed by the sides.

"The statement of the US Delegation of March 30, 1972, once again raised the question of the need to include among systems to be 'frozen,' besides land-based ICBM silo launchers, also land-based unprotected (soft) and mobile ICBM launchers.

"In this connection we would like to say that, in general, expanding [the number of] types of systems to be 'frozen' contains within itself the risk of considerable complication of the problem and the consequent dragging out of the period of time required to work out a draft Interim Agreement.

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"We proceed from the premise that the May 20, 1971, understanding did not set the goal to resolve all the questions arising in connection with the problem of limiting strategic offensive armaments, but provided that the range of questions relating to these armaments in a broad scope will be considered at follow-on negotiations. In this sense it would hardly be advisable to assume that when a portion of strategic offensive weapons is being considered, they should be taken up in their totality, since the whole does not and cannot consist of its one individual part. Taking this into account, we take the position that in connection with working out the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement, there is no necessity to consider the land-based mobile ICBM launcher question, and that raising it would distract us from the tasks before us.

"As for unprotected fixed land-based ICBM launchers and old types of missiles, they cannot be a cause of concern to the sides, since, as you know, the sides have long since stopped building such launchers; therefore there is no need to include these types of ICBM launchers in the composition of systems to be temporarily 'frozen.' I recall that in Vienna the question was raised as to whether the American side intended to resume construction of such obsolete systems. This subject was exhausted by the clarification [negative response] given at that time.

"I would like to repeat that as I understand it, by no means does either side see the purpose of this stage of the negotiations as being the inclusion in the agreement of still more questions related to the limitation of strategic armaments, but consider it necessary to fix their attention on what ensues from the May 20, 1971, understanding, setting aside other questions for the follow-on negotiations and preparing a good basis for them.

"The Soviet side believes that for the present stage of the negotiations a 'freeze' on land-based ICBM silo launchers is sufficient and that an agreement should be concluded on precisely that basis.

"The US Delegation proposes to include in the draft Interim Agreement definitions of strategic of-

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fensive systems subject to the "freeze." But after all, we have been engaged in negotiations for more than two years, and it seems to us that each side has always understood precisely which types of weapons were under discussion. There are no reasons to suppose that during the relatively brief period of effectiveness of the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement this situation could change.

"The understanding of the sides of precisely which ICBMs will be subject to the 'freeze' agreement, as well as the capability of national technical means to identify ICBM types with the required certainty, are completely sufficient, in our view, to prevent the sides from having any doubts on this score. Therefore adoption of the above-mentioned proposals on definitions which include quantitative criteria is absolutely unfounded.

"We have taken note of the US side's statement of March 30 to the effect that the 'freeze' date would be the date of signing of the Interim Agreement. This corresponds to the real state of affairs to a greater degree than earlier proposals. However, we believe that the most appropriate date to begin the 'freeze' on land-based ICBM silo launchers would be July 1, 1972 (but not earlier than entry into force of the ABM Treaty). It is necessary to take into account that both the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM Systems could enter into force by July 1, 1972. Therefore establishing such a date would encourage the sides to take steps to speed entry into force of the ABM Treaty as well as of the Interim Agreement.

"As for duration of the 'freeze' understanding, the Soviet side proceeds from the premise that such an understanding would be in effect for a specific period of time, agreed by the sides.

"In the course of the Vienna phase of the negotiations we proposed that this period of time be no longer than two years. The US side then expressed misgivings concerning the brevity of such a period of time and its possible inadequacy for completion of the follow-on active negotiations with respect to the limitation of

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strategic offensive arms. Taking into account these considerations of the US side and desiring in a constructive spirit to facilitate reaching agreement on the 'freeze' on strategic offensive arms, the USSR Delegation conducted appropriate consultations. We are instructed to propose that the Interim Agreement remain in force during the conduct of active negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, but for no more than three years.

"We proceed from the premise that in the course of the follow-on active negotiations on the limitation of strategic offensive arms to replace the Interim Agreement, the sides will concentrate on working out agreement on more complete measures with respect to the limitation of these arms. The existence of the Treaty on the Limitation of ABM systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will undoubtedly create more favorable conditions and will facilitate successful conduct of these negotiations.

"We believe that establishment of a longer period of effectiveness for the Interim Agreement would not meet the objectives set for the Interim Agreement. And will this not give grounds for dragging out the follow-on negotiations, perhaps for an indefinite period?

"As for the proposal of the US side to establish even now a specific number of strategic offensive missile launchers for research, development, evaluation and training, we consider the solution of this question at this phase of the negotiations to be premature. Questions of limiting such launchers can be considered at the follow-on negotiations on limiting strategic offensive arms.

"At the same time, taking into account the comments of the US side presented in Vienna, and desiring to solve in a constructive way questions that arise, the USSR Delegation would be prepared to proceed from the premise that during the period of effectiveness of the 'freeze' understanding, construction of launchers at test ranges may be undertaken only for purposes of research, development, evaluation and training."